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BOOK REVIEW
QUESTIONING QUIRIN
CARL TOBIAS•
LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND
AMERICAN LAW (UNIV. PRESS OF KAN. 2003) 193 PP.

Recent developments in the "war on terrorism" have accorded Ex parte
Quirin, 1 a World War II Era opinion, fresh relevance. Quirin held that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) had the authority to establish a
military commission, which subsequently tried, found guilty, and suggested
punishment for eight Nazi saboteurs immediately after the Supreme Court
rejected their petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Quirin languished as a
wartime artifact until November 2001, when President George W. Bush
invoked the ruling to create military tribunals, as well as to purportedly
abrogate federal court jurisdiction and deny federal court access to those
prosecuted or held for suspected terrorist behavior. The Supreme Court
recently invalidated President Bush's action.2 High-echelon administration
officials have concomitantly used Quirin to support related measures in the
"war on terrorism" and to litigate terrorism cases. The new events have
afforded Quirin much salience, provoking great interest in, and
considerable reliance on, the opinion among federal lawmakers, judges, and
scholars.

• Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to Peggy Sanner
for ideas, Judy Canter for processing, and Russell Williams for generous, continuing support.
Errors that remain are mine alone.
1
317 U.S. 1 (1942). For valuable assessments of the relevant factual background in Ex
parte Quirin, see GEORGE J. DASCH, EIGHT SPIES AGAINST AMERICA (1959); MICHAEL
DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004); EUGENE RACHLIS, THEY CAME TO
KILL: THE STORY OF EIGHT SABOTEURS IN AMERICA (1961).
2
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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Thus, Louis Fisher's new work, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial: A Military
Tribunal and American Law3 (Nazi Saboteurs), and his valuable
contribution to illuminating Quirin merit scrutiny. In this Review, I first
The Review then treats the
descriptively assess Nazi Saboteurs.
monograph's numerous beneficial features and ascertains that it enhances
understanding of the important decision in Quirin. I conclude with several
recommendations for future analysis of Quirin's impact.
I. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Fisher first evaluates the mission Germany assembled to conduct
sabotage in the United States once the U.S. declared war. 4 He finds that the
eight saboteurs were ordinary persons, 5 who attended a training camp6 and
landed on American soil with explosives in mid-June of 1942. 7 Fisher
analyzes the saboteurs' mistakes, 8 such as tendering a bribe to a Coast
Guard official who witnessed their arrival. 9 Two quickly concluded that
defecting might save them, and all eight were in custody by June 27. 10
He then surveys the commission FDR and Attorney General Francis
Biddle devised, mainly to facilitate capital punishment. 11 On July 2, an
3
LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW
(2003). Related books are by DOBBS, supra note I, RACHLIS, supra note I, and DASCH,
supra note I, with the last being an unpersuasive account by one saboteur. Louis Fisher has
furnished Congress cogent advice for three decades as a researcher for the congressional
research service. See infra text accompanying note 75.
4
FISHER, supra note 3, at 1-23; accord Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-22; David J. Danelski, The
Saboteurs' Case, I J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 61-64, 66 (1996); Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian
Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 734-45 (2002).
5
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 6-16; see also Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court
Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59,
62 (1980); Danelski, supra note 4, at 61-64, 66.
6
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 16-23; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Danelski, supra
note 4, at 63.
7
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 25-27; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21; Belknap, supra note
5, at 62; Robert Cushman, Ex parte Quirin et al-The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28 CORNELL L.Q.
54 (1942).
8
I rely substantially in the remainder of this paragraph on FISHER, supra note 3, at 25-42.
9
See id. at 26-27; see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 62 n.9; Danelski, supra note 4, at
63-64.
10
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 32-42; see also RACHLIS, supra note 1, at 150-65;
Belknap, supra note 5, at 62; Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case History, 11 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 131, 136 (1943).
11
I rely substantially in this paragraph on FISHER, supra note 3, at 43-85. See id. at 4849; see also Turley, supra note 4, at 736-37; Memorandum from President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt to Att'y Gen. Francis Biddle (June 30, 1942) (Box 76, FDR MSS); Memorandum
from Att'y Gen. Francis Biddle to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, (June 30, 1942)
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Executive Order instituted the tribunal, named its members, prosecutors,
and defense lawyers, and delineated its strictures. 12 On the same day, a
Presidential Proclamation ostensibly vitiated federal court jurisdiction. 13
The approach of the tribunal differed from a court martial: it tolerated
lenient evidentiary standards, allowed conviction and proposed sentences
on a two-thirds vote, and named Biddle the prosecutor and FDR the final
decision-maker. 14 The commission invented rules as needed over the threeweek secret trial. 15 When the defense said it might file habeas corpus
petitions, I 6 Biddle agreed to seek Supreme Court review, which was
granted. I 7 After the Supreme Court denied relief on July 31, Is the tribunal
promptly concluded, suggested that all the saboteurs be executed, and sent
the 3000 page transcript to FDR. I 9 Within days, FDR imposed the death
penalty on six of the offenders and long sentences on the two defectors. 20
Fisher turns to the Court's proceeding. 2 I He assesses the briefs, the
nine hour oral arguments, and the terse per curiam order2 2 that rejected the
petitions and stated that an opinion would be issued later. 23 Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone could find minimal justification for the order, 24 but
urged that the Court resolve unclear questions against the saboteurs, lest it
((OF) 5036, FDR MSS).
12
See Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942); see also FISHER, supra
note 3, at 52-53.
13
See Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942); see also FISHER, supra
note 3, at 50-52.
14
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 50-53; see also Danelski, supra note 4, at 66-67; Turley,
supra note 4, at 736-37.
15
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 53-64; see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 66-67; Danelski,
supra note 4, at 67.
16
Belknap, supra note 5, at 68-69; see FISHER, supra note 3, at 56, 64-67.
17
FISHER, supra note 3, at 56, 67-68; accord RACHLIS, supra note 1, at 181-82; Danelski,
supra note 4, at 68.
18
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 68-69; see also RACHLIS, supra note 1, at 272; Turley,
supra note 4, at 739.
19
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 66-77; see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 77; Danelski,
supra note 4, at 71.
2
FISHER, supra note 3, at 77-80; accord Belknap, supra note 5, at 77; Danelski, supra
note 4, at 72. Fisher offers instructive material on the fourteen people who were arrested for
assisting the saboteurs. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 68-71.
21
I rely substantially in this paragraph on FISHER, supra note 3, at 87-125.
22
See id. at 87-108; see also RACHLIS, supra note 1, at 272; Belknap, supra note 5, at 7075; Danelski, supra note 4, at 68-69. Fisher shows how these developments occurred in
three days, emphasizing the "rush to judgment."
23
FISHER, supra note 3, at 68, 108; accord Belknap, supra note 5, at 75-76; Danelski,
supra note 4, at 71.
24
FISHER, supra note 3, at 109-13; accord Belknap, supra note 5, at 81-87; Danelski,
supra note 4, at 72-75.
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be criticized for not deciding them prior to the executions. 25 When no
agreement materialized, Justice Robert Jackson penned a document that
resembled a concurrence. Jackson's piece jeopardized the unanimity that
some members thought was essential, 26 and led Justice Felix Frankfurter to
write "F.F. 's Soliloquy." 27 Frankfurter's imaginary dialogue reviled the
saboteurs for litigating and provoking an interbranch confrontation, while
its patriotic appeal implored the brethren to eschew abstract theorizing in
wartime. 28 Consensus galvanized when Jackson and the other Justices
joined Stone three months after the order was issued. 29 The opinion was
very narrow. The Court exercised jurisdiction and rejected the petitioners'
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims on the merits. 30 It labeled the eight
saboteurs unlawful combatants, making them offenders against the laws of
war subject to military tribunal trial and punishment. 31 However, although
the Court assumed that there were offenses against the laws of war that are
"constitutionally triable only by jury," an idea articulated by Ex parte
Milligan, 32 in this case, the Court found that the petitioners were charged

25
Memorandum from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to the Supreme Court, (Sept. 25, 1942)
(Box 68, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Div., Library of Cong.); see FISHER, supra
note 3, at 111-13; Belknap, supra note 5, at 78; Turley, supra note 4, at 740.
26
Memorandum from Justice Robert H. Jackson to the Supreme Court, (Oct. 23, 1942)
(Box 124, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Cong.); see FISHER, supra note 3, at 114-16.
For the concerns of Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas and Owen Roberts that Justice
Stone resolved, see A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L.
REv. 309, 324-25 (2003) [hereinafter Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited].
27
See Felix Frankfurter, F.F's Soliloquy (Oct. 23, 1942), reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2d
438 (2002); see also FISHER, supra note 3, at 117-21; G. Edward White, Felix Franlifurter' s
Soliloquy in Ex parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 423 (2002).
28
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 117-21; Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 439-40; White,
supra note 27, at 432-35; see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 80; Danelski, supra note 4, at
76-79.
29
See Notes Exchanged by Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Robert H. Jackson, (Oct.
1942) (Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law Sch.); Notes Exchanged by Justice
Owen Roberts to Justice Felix Frankfurter, undated (Paige Box 12, Frankfurter Papers,
Harvard Law Sch.); see also FISHER, supra note 3, at 121-25; Danelski, supra note 4, at 7879; Turley, supra note 4, at 742.
30
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 25, 38-45 (1942); see also FISHER, supra note 3, at
121-25; I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299-300 (3d ed. 2000);
Belknap, supra note 5, at 84-85.
31
The saboteurs, accordingly, were not entitled to a number of specific protections that
prisoners of war typically receive. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; see also FISHER, supra note 3,
at 123-24; Neal Katya! & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1286-87 (2002).
32
71 U.S. 2, 3 (1866); see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 128-37
(1998); see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 85-86; Katya! & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1286
n. l 02; Turley, supra note 4, at 732-34, 742.

2006]

QUESTIONING QUIRIN

369

with offenses that were not required to be tried by jury. 33 The defendants
contended that the Court's holding in Milligan made the laws inapplicable
"to citizens in states which have upheld" the government's authority and
where the federal courts are open. 34 Yet Stone limited that ruling to its
facts, as Milligan "was not an enemy belligerent."35 The Justices found the
commission's proceeding valid, concluded that the Articles of War did not
"afford any basis for issuing the writ," and denied the habeas writs, but the
members disagreed on the rationale. 36
Fisher "rethinks" the tribunal's validity and efficacy. 37 First, he
describes Quirin's mixed evaluations at the time. 38 He asserts that FDR
learned from the 1942 initiative to use the military system because civilians
did not prosecute later saboteurs. 39 Fisher addresses wartime judicial
deference to military and executive authorities by canvassing martial law in
Hawaii, Japanese-Americans' internment, and the commission trial of
General Yamashita. 40 He analyzes Supreme Court decisions issued after the
war41 and considers whether their balance of national security and civil
liberties portended Milligan's revitalization. 42 Fisher offers views in favor
of and against the Bush tribunals, which he compares to the 1942 effort. 43
33

See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29; see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953,
978-85 (2002).
34
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121); see RICHARD FALLON, JR.,
DANIEL MELTZER & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 408-10 (5th ed. 2003).
35
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46; see Katya! & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1277-87; Turley,
supra note 4, at 742.
36
Some of the Justices thought Congress did not intend the Articles to govern a tribunal
trial of enemy invaders, see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-47; FISHER, supra note 3, at 123-25,
while others found that the Articles allowed the measures used, but did not foreclose use of a
tribunal in this case. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47; FISHER, supra note 3, at 125.
37
I rely in this paragraph on FISHER, supra note 3, at 127-70; see also Turley, supra note
4, at 718-57.
38
FISHER, supra note 3, at 127-38; accord Belknap, supra note 5, at 88. Typical is
Cushman, supra note 7.
39
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 107-120; see also Military Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 548
(1945).
40
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 144-52; see also TRIBE, supra note 30, at 237, 300-01,
670, 966, 1320; Belknap, supra note 5, at 89-93; Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).
41
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 152-58; see also Katya! & Tribe, supra note 31, at 129395.
42
See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text; see also FISHER, supra note 3, at 15258.
43
See FISHER, supra note 3, at 159-70; see also Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited, supra
note 26; Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military
Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1412-
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The author concludes with helpful insights, mostly disparaging FDR's
endeavor and Quirin as precedents. 44 He believes that the approaches of the
1942 commission and Court were flawed, and measures which better honor
45
national values existed then and are available now. Fisher claims tribunal
use accorded the Executive excessive power because FDR named the
members, restricted legislative and judicial involvement, and was the
ultimate arbiter. 46 He also considers these attributes to be major faults of
the tribunal: (1) that no president could have examined the transcript with
sufficient legal acumen and care; (2) that the rules were formulated as the
trial proceeded; and (3) the unwarranted secrecy of the trial, which reflected
the need to hide the confessions, governmental ineptitude, and the meting
out of the death penalty rather than focusing on security.47 Fisher also finds
that the Supreme Court process was troubled, albeit less problematic than
the commission's proceedings. The purported nullification of jurisdiction
compromised the Justices, who had to "make a statement" by undertaking a
limited review. 48 Furthermore, the Court failed to engage in "careful
judicial deliberation. " 49
II. CONTRIBUTIONS

Nazi
Quirin. 5
gathering,
transcript

°

Saboteurs is a cautionary tale that improves appreciation of
Fisher offers novel perspectives derived from meticulously
assessing, and synthesizing data, particularly the commission
of what occurred in 1942. For example, he scrutinizes and

35 (2002); Katya! & Tribe, supra note 31; Turley, supra note 4, at 652-53, 743-57.
44
I rely substantially in this paragraph on FISHER, supra note 3, at 171-75. Fisher
perceptively admonishes that contemporary citation to the Ex parte Quirin opinion as "a
precedent does not justify its repetition." Id. at 161.
45
Id. at 161; see also Belknap, supra note 5, at 60-61, 88-89; Katya! & Tribe, supra note
31, at 1277-87.
46
The President displaced the Judge Advocate General, who served as a lead tribunal
prosecutor, with the Attorney General. FISHER, supra note 3, at 172-73; accord Danelski,
supra note 4, at 80; Turley, supra note 4, at 743.
47
FISHER, supra note 3, at 172-73; see Belknap, supra note 5, at 62-68; Danelski, supra
note 4, at 64-67.
48
The Supreme Court Justices also lacked very much applicable information about the
secret commission proceeding. FISHER, supra note 3, at 172; see id. at 172-74; see also
Belknap, supra note 5, at 78-88; Turley, supra note 4, at 738-43.
49
The dearth of appellate and district court treatment, the hastily-issued per curiam
order, and the belated, unpersuasive full opinion attest to this paucity of careful judicial
deliberation. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 173-74.
50
Earlier book-length treatment was self-serving or written for popular audiences, while
law review articles were dated or narrowly focused on legal doctrine. See supra notes 3 and
38. This new work is the clearest, fullest rendition of Quirin.

2006]

QUESTIONING QUIRIN

371

compares the tribunal rules, the Articles of War, and the Manual for CourtsMartial, all of which illuminate the proceeding's flaws. 51 Moreover, his
analysis of the defense's strategy in the hearing by, for example,
emphasizing procedural deficiencies and asserting defendants' rights,
clarifies the Justices' review. 52 Fisher also confirms, elucidates, and
amplifies traditional understandings that criticize the 1942 initiative and
Quirin. The author documents FDR's conscious selection of a tribunal to
facilitate a predetermined result; use of odious means, such as pressure
tactics, to secure this end; 53 and the ways these and other questionable
internal machinations affected the Court. 54
Fisher emphasizes the World War II context, but his tone is strikingly
new. He filters the 2001 revival of commissions through Quirin and
addresses myriad urgent and complex issues in light of all the improprieties
that suffused the earlier tribunal and judicial opinion. Fisher warns about
the hazards of concentrating power when he reveals how President Bush
adopted commissions and ostensibly eliminated jurisdiction without
lawmakers' input, despite the specific constitutional authorization of
Congress to establish federal courts and prescribe their jurisdiction. 55 Also
helpful is Fisher's contrast between this nascent effort, which governs any
non-United States citizen who there is "reason to believe" did or will
violate "all applicable laws," and its model, FDR's order, which covered
eight individuals who had committed a few specified acts. 56
In sum, Fisher details how FDR fashioned a tribunal approved by the
Justices, and suggests that President Bush improperly relied on this
endeavor to institute commissions and apply other anti-terrorism measures,
51

See supra notes 12, 14-15, 46, 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 54, 60, 64 and
accompanying text.
52
See supra text accompanying note 16. Transcript review shows the mundane, such as
reading a confession into the record, and the banal, such as the executions' details and
FDR's apparent obsession with them. Fisher's Court analysis is as cogent, if less novel,
because others have evaluated it. See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 5; Danelski, supra note 4.
53
See, e.g., supra notes 11, 15, 19, 20 and accompanying text; infra notes 60, 64 and
accompanying text.
54
See supra notes 22, 36, 49 and accompanying text. Fisher reaffirms, clarifies, and
elaborates related critical themes, namely how the Supreme Court elevates security over
liberty in wartime, which others have explored. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 32; Earl
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 191-93 (1962).
55
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (2001); see Katya! & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1280. Bush first worked
with Congress on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution. See Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); FISHER, supra note 3, at 149-60.
56
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR 113-14 (2002); Katya! & Tribe,
supra note 31, at 1281, 1284-87. Clear explication of such abstruse notions as separation of
powers should make Fisher's book accessible.
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such as detention of suspects and litigation of terrorism cases. Fisher
painstakingly reviews the deficient tribunal and the Supreme Court's
actions, and his treatment further undermines the value that the 1942 effort
and opinion might have as precedent.
III. SUGGESTIONS
Despite the book's many virtues, it leaves a few questions unanswered.
One is whether Quirin's expansive reading, proffered to justify modem
commission adoption and use, withstands scrutiny. 57 More important to
tribunal creation are Articles I and III, which empower Congress to institute
federal courts and grant their jurisdiction, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 58 which suggests that this delegation precludes the chief
executive from abolishing jurisdiction. 59 Moreover, basic ideas limit Quirin
today: the facts were unusual and its holding was narrow; lawmakers had
declared war and authorized commissions; and respected observers have
now discredited the tribunal and Court processes. 60 Thus, the Executive
lacks power to vitiate jurisdiction, although commissions may be legitimate
in a few limited contexts, such as overseas prosecutions resulting from
declared wars. 61 Tribunals also warrant analysis because the Justices
recently invalidated President Bush's commissions, and Congress recently
Judges who entertain defendants' habeas writs
authorized them. 62
challenging tribunals and detention must remember that the Quirin Court
decided petitioners' Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims on the merits,
despite FDR's attempts to nullify jurisdiction. 63 The factors that I

57

See Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited, supra note 26; Dickinson, supra note 43, at
1420; Turley, supra note 4, at 749-58.
58
See 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown
Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 375-431 (2002) [hereinafter Bryant & Tobias,
Youngstown Revisited]; Symposium, Youngstown at Fifty, 19 CONST. COMMENT. I (2002).
59
For the idea's full exposition, see Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra note
58; see also Turley, supra note 4, at 755.
60
Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1420; Katya) & Tribe, supra note 31, at 1284-87; Turley,
supra note 4, at 754.
61
See, e.g., Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, supra note 58; Katya) & Tribe,
supra note 31, at 1293-95; Turley, supra note 4.
62
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 2005), rev 'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); see Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see also Jeffrey Smith, On Prosecuting Detainees,
WASH. POST, Juiy 28, 2006, at A23; Jeffrey Toobin, Inside the Wire, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9,
2004, at 36.
63
See, e.g., supra notes 13, 18, 22, 38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 55
and accompanying text.
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pinpointed64 mandate rejection of the opinion's invocation for some tenets,
namely judicial acquiescence to the Executive. 65 The courts as well should
modernize Quirin, so that it reflects burgeoning habeas, 66 international, and
human rights law developed since 1942. 67 Judges deciding recent cases
have actually used such ideas. For example, Hamdan v Rumsfeld invoked
the Geneva Conventions. 68
Elaboration of certain phenomena would be valuable. Fisher's
admonitions respecting tribunal use and executive power's concentration
are illustrative. Nonetheless, increased scrutiny of commissions' impact on
world relations, especially given how the United States has disparaged
others that employ analogous measures and detain suspects without access
to lawyers, would yield significant benefits. 69 For instance, concerns over
global perceptions led to the selection of international war crimes tribunals,
rather than military commissions, that tried many German and Japanese
officials after 1945. 70 Similarly, it might be worthwhile to further evaluate
64
These include the unusual facts; the use of a tribunal to secure a result; the hurried
review, order, and execution; the improper pressures; and the unpersuasive, narrow opinion.
See supra notes 13, 14, 18, 36, 60 and accompanying text.
65
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1420;
Turley, supra note 4, at 734-43. But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 474-77 (4th Cir.
2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev 'd, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev 'd, 542 U.S. 426
(2004). In Hamdi, a plurality of the Supreme Court found Quirin the "most apposite
precedent" on citizen detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004). Justice
Scalia, in dissent, said that "the case was not this Court's finest hour." Id. at 569 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
66
The Quirin Court performed a very narrow jurisdictional inquiry which was typical in
1942. See Bryant & Tobias, Quirin Revisited, supra note 26; see also FALLON, JR., MELTZER
& SHAPIRO, supra note 34, at 411-13; George Rutherglen, Structural Uncertainty, Habeas
Corpus and the Jurisdiction ofMilitary Tribunals, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 397 (2002).
67
Due process is a critical example. See Dickinson, supra note 43, at 1421-35; Turley,
supra note 4, at 756-57. Scrutiny of Quirin's use for other terrorism initiatives, namely
litigating detention of suspects, would help. The government and certain judges have
invoked Quirin for broad ideas, such as executive deference, which it cannot support. See
sources cited supra notes 57 and 65. In fairness, much of this occurred when Nazi Saboteurs
was in press.
68
126 S. Ct. at 2795; see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-66 (D.D.C.
2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Padilla v. Hanft,
389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1649 (2006).
69
Turley, supra note 4, at 757; David Cole, How the Court Struck Back, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 10, 2006.
70
GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 163-65, 180-81 (2000); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS 28-33 (1992); Douglas Kmiec, In the Wake of Hamdan, Should We Opt for an
International
Tribunal for
Gitmo Detainees?,
FINDLAW,
July
6,
2006,
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how the tribunals' creation affects horizontal power distribution of authority
vis-a-vis lawmakers and judges, in light of related executive claims
trenchantly illustrated by domestic surveillance. 71 It would also be useful to
calibrate the optimal balance between security and liberty when terrorism is
ubiquitous, and determine whether courts are reliable guardians of freedom
today, and, if not, whether Congress or additional entities such as the media
would be preferable. 72 Such an expansion effort may suggest felicitous
ways to allocate governmental responsibility for various constituents in the
"war on terrorism." 73 This knowledge would help policymakers and
citizens better appreciate the overseas and domestic ramifications of
enlarging America's power vis-a-vis other nations and individuals and of
eroding legislative and judicial branch authority. 74
My views do not undercut Fisher's important contributions. However,
he might have treated a few notions specifically or with augmented detail,
gleaned more lessons from the 1942 commission and Quirin, and tendered
some additional prescriptions. It would be valuable to have greater insights
from someone who, for three decades, has furnished Congress with astute
policy, legal, and historical research on numerous questions which tribunals
implicate, and who has personally witnessed the origins, growth, and
resolution of many fractious disputes analogous to that over military
commissions. 75 Amplifying his expert observations drawn from this unique
perspective on why developments happened as they did and on salutary
measures for improving tribunals would be worthwhile, especially to
address global and American concerns about such bodies in the posthttp://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060706_kmiec.html.
71
S. 3001, 109th Cong. (2006); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OIG, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES
(2003); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; see JOHN NOONAN, NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER (2002);
see also Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, I 05 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).
72
Judges have warned that courts are not reliable guardians. See sources cited supra
note 54; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Louis
Fisher, Who's Minding the Courts on Rights?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at M2. Hamdi and
Hamdan suggest otherwise.
An example of congressional action is the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which expressly authorizes tribunals. Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see Bryant & Tobias, Youngstown
Revisited, supra note 58, at 386-99.
73
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK (2006); RICHARD POSNER,
CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2005); see also JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How
SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005).
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Others have explored a rather analogous interrelationship of global and domestic
concerns. See THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLOR LINE IN THE COLD WAR (2001); MARY
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Hamdan context. These ideas are essential now that the world and America
face intractable problems related to security and human rights, and public
debate is so controversial.
IV. CONCLUSION

Nazi Saboteurs greatly advances comprehension of how FDR
depended on a military tribunal, sanctioned by the Justices, and how the
Bush Administration invoked this precedent when establishing
commissions and justifying related terrorism measures. This account
elucidates the ongoing discourse about tribunal legitimacy and advisability,
how to balance national security with civil liberties, and how to distribute
federal power in a time of terror.

